

JUSTÍCIA

How Andorra Legally Manufactures Institutional Monopolies



Imatge original de la publicació / miniatura del vídeo

n Ordino's 2023 local election, Maria del Mar Coma won 55.64% of the vote and Enric Dolsa 44.36%. Yet the final institutional result was not 6-4 or anything close to the voters' actual split. It became 8 councillors to 2 — 80% of the institutional power versus 20%. The voters did not create that supermajority. The electoral law did.

This investigation traces that distortion back thirty years, to 1993, when Enric Dolsa himself warned in the Andorran Parliament that the communal electoral formula could allow a list with only 30% of the vote to control 7 of 10 seats, leaving the remaining 70% of voters with just three representatives. His attempt to correct the system was rejected by 14 votes to 11, with 3 abstentions.

EN AQUEST NÚMERO

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No es época para tontos | 2026-09-06 | ENGLISH



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At the centre of the system is Article 66: the most-voted communal list automatically receives half of the seats, regardless of the winning margin, and then participates again in the proportional distribution of the remaining seats. In an extreme but legally possible scenario, 26% of the vote can become 70% of the institutional power.

The documentary also examines Andorra's national electoral architecture: 14 national proportional seats and 14 territorial seats, two for each parish, with a winner-takes-all 2-0 rule at parish level. That means a one-vote difference can produce total territorial control for the winner and zero representation for the runner-up.

We also revisit the controversy surrounding the 456 judicially deposited votes in Ordino, the legal challenges brought by Enric Dolsa and Jordina Bringué, and the courts' conclusion that no

electoral fraud was proven. The issue is therefore not a claim of stolen votes, but a deeper question of forensic auditability, chain of custody and the burden of proof when the state controls the evidence needed to verify an election.

The final part explores the reform battle: open lists, preferential voting, panachage, STV, proportional allocation, the failed 2026 reform attempt, and the two-step roadmap for changing the system — first through electoral law, and later, if necessary, through constitutional reform and referendum.

The central question is simple:

If a democracy can legally transform 30% of the vote into 70% of the power, is the real democratic danger electoral fraud — or the law itself operating exactly as designed?

Article original: informacions.ad | Vídeo original

Altres versions: CASTELLÀ

Holding Andorra's Justice System Accountable | A Direct Appeal to the UN, GRECO & Europe

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This investigation examines whether Andorra's justice system has the structural safeguards required to guarantee genuine judicial independence in one of Europe's smallest and most interconnected states. The issue is not whether every judge, prosecutor or institution is corrupt, but whether the system is capable of detecting, preventing and correcting conflicts of interest, institutional dependency, excessive delays and pressure on lawyers when they occur.

The podcast analyses GRECO's concerns over the composition and independence of the Consell

Superior de la Justícia, the body responsible for appointments, promotions, discipline and judicial governance, and examines UN warnings concerning corruption safeguards, whistleblower protection and the absence of sufficiently independent mechanisms of accountability.

It also confronts one of the most disturbing figures in the material: 49.3% of Andorra’s prison population was reported as being in pre-trial detention, with an average duration cited in the podcast of 242 days. The central question is whether provisional detention, procedural delay and institutional weakness can transform the judicial process itself into a form of punishment before conviction.

The programme further examines the independence of lawyers, the chilling effect that criminal proceedings can have on human-rights defenders, the case of Vanessa Mendoza Cortés, and the need to preserve unresolved historical cases through an Archive of Judicial Memory capable of identifying recurring institutional patterns.

At the centre of the intervention is ANDORRA JUSTICE WATCH, whose message to international institutions is deliberately simple:

“We are not asking you to believe us. We are asking you to investigate.”

The appeal is directed to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, GRECO, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and CEPEJ, requesting international scrutiny, institutional engagement, objective judicial data and, where justified, direct examination of the situation in Andorra.

This is not presented as an attack on Andorra or its judges. The argument is the opposite: meaningful external scrutiny can protect judicial independence by ensuring that judges are able to decide cases without fear, dependency or retaliation.

Andorra can become a European model of transparency and judicial accountability. But first, the files must be opened to scrutiny.

Don’t believe it. Investigate.

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ANDORRA

ANDORRA, LA MATRIX DE LA COMODITAT: I SI PREFERIM NO SABER LA VERITAT?

Retorno a la Zona Muerta · Josep Guirao | 2026-09-06 | CATALÀ



Imatge: miniatura original de la publicació.

Matrix no parla només de màquines, intel·ligència artificial o una realitat simulada. Parla del control, de la percepció, de la por a qüestionar allò que sempre hem cregut i, sobretot, de la temptació de tornar voluntàriament a una mentida confortable.

En aquest monòleg, Josep Guirao trasllada la metàfora de Matrix a Andorra i planteja una pregunta incòmoda: què passa quan la informació és accessible, quan les contradiccions són visibles i quan, malgrat tot, una part de la societat prefereix no mirar?

Cypher és el símbol central: no és l’home enganyat, sinó aquell que ja coneix la realitat i decideix tornar a la simulació perquè és més còmoda. Una reflexió sobre el silenci, l’autocensura, les relacions de poder en una societat petita, la independència de les institucions i la responsabilitat individual de preguntar, comprovar i pensar per un mateix.


Aquest vídeo no demana que creguis Josep Guirao. Demana exactament el contrari: qüestiona, comprova, llegeix, contrasta i decideix tu mateix.

Perquè sortir de la Matrix no és canviar una versió oficial per una altra.
És deixar de tenir por de mirar.

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FROM BALLOT BOXES TO INVISIBLE CODE | Could Andorra's Democracy Become a Black Box?

No es época para tontos | 2026-09-06 | ENGLISH



Imatge: miniatura original de la publicació.

What happens when a democracy moves from physical ballot boxes to invisible code?

This investigation by Andorra Justice Watch begins with the controversy surrounding Andorra's 2023 general election, when approximately 9,010 votes — nearly 45% of all votes cast — were deposited before election day under judicial custody.

No court established mass electoral fraud. But the case exposed a deeper democratic question: when a citizen challenges the integrity of a vote, can the State produce independent, auditable evidence proving that the chain of custody was protected?

That question has now reached the international level, with the electoral dispute described in the sources as pending before the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva.

But this investigation goes further.

While the controversy over physical ballots continues, Andorra is rapidly building a new digital State infrastructure through Andorra Digital, SA — a public technology company with responsibilities involving software, cybersecurity, digital identity, interoperability and major government systems.

And electronic voting is no longer theoretical. In 2026, the CASS initiated a tender for an electronic voting solution before the project was stopped for legal reasons.

So the question becomes unavoidable:

If it was difficult to reconstruct what happened to a physical ballot box over several days, how could citizens reconstruct what an algorithm did in four milliseconds?

The podcast examines electronic voting, privileged insiders, source code, cryptographic keys, server logs, software independence, independent audits and the warnings issued by the Council of Europe and OSCE/ODIHR.

It also examines Elon Musk's warning that even a small risk of electronic voting systems being hacked by humans or artificial intelligence may be too high — while making clear that the decisive democratic standards come from international institutions, not from Musk.

Andorra Justice Watch is not accusing Andorra Digital, its employees or the Andorran Government of manipulating elections.

The warning is structural and preventive:

No Government, public company, telecommunications operator or private contractor should ever control enough components of an electoral system to alter, conceal or render a result unverifiable without immediate independent detection.

The investigation calls on the United Nations, OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe to scrutinise any future electronic-voting system in Andorra before it is deployed — not after a disputed election.

The vote may be modernised. Democracy must never become a black box.

The vote is secret. The system protecting it must be verifiable.

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