Texto original publicado por No es época para tontos.
La Querola d’Ordino was conceived as one of Andorra’s most ambitious luxury developments: almost twenty years of planning, around fourteen years of construction, seven buildings, roughly 34,000 square metres and 51 luxury homes. The original budget was about €50 million, but by June 2026 the promoters stated that accumulated investment had reached €130 million, while claiming that rebuilding it could exceed €200 million. Homes were marketed at roughly €2.4 million to €6.3 million each, and around half were said to have been sold.
Then came the fire. At approximately 1:45 a.m. on September 22, 2026, emergency services were alerted to a blaze in the central part of the complex. More than thirty firefighters were mobilized, with assistance from Bombers de la Generalitat. Six of the seven buildings were devastated and provisional estimates pointed to around 22,000 square metres affected: roughly 10,000 m² of residential space and 12,000 m² of underground parking and infrastructure. There were no injuries because the development still lacked its first occupancy licence and remained unoccupied.
This first part of LA VALIRA’s investigation asks a basic question: how can a project developed over nearly two decades, with enormous financial and technical resources behind it, suffer destruction on this scale in a single night?
We go back to UA-18.B, where Casa Projectes SL appears as the declared owner and urban developer. We reconstruct the 2011 agreement that unlocked the project and the documented disagreement over the mandatory transfer to the Comú d’Ordino: €968,637.91 according to the promoter versus €1,216,797.70 according to the Comú, a difference of €248,159.79. We also examine the “projecte singular” treatment and ask what had actually been inspected or certified by Seguretat Industrial i Vehicle before the fire.
The absence of a first occupancy licence is central. What remained pending, and which fire-safety and technical systems were already operational?
The September disaster was not the first fire. The transcript cites two earlier incidents during construction in May and June 2024. That makes this the third fire in less than three years. What was investigated after the earlier incidents? What changed? Why could seven supposedly independent buildings be so extensively affected in one night?
Then we follow the money. Casa Projectes appears as the landowner and urban promoter; Projectes Singulars as the economic promoter; Jordi Cerqueda as a central driving figure; and Xavier Santamaria as a key link between the Cerqueda family office, Projectes Singulars and Andbank. The transcript notes that Santamaria was also a board member of Andbank. In 2024, the Cerqueda family held 34.55% of the bank and the Ribas Duró family 36.96%. Món Immobiliari, involved in marketing the homes, was 100% owned by Andbank. Published reports cited in the investigation also attribute project financing to Andbank.
That raises another major question: where did the additional €80 million come from between the original €50 million budget and the final €130 million declared investment? After the fire, where does the financial risk sit—with the promoter, the bank, the insurers, or the buyers?
The investigation also examines Andorra’s international private-banking strategy. The transcript documents efforts to attract high-net-worth clients from Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, naming Rza Aliyev and Alexander Felsing and noting Andbank Monaco’s focus on Russian-speaking clients. It also places the story inside the political shift of 2022, when Xavier Espot’s government, with Finance Minister Èric Jover, aligned Andorra with sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The measure passed with 20 votes in favour, while Carine Montaner abstained and defended neutrality.
Published figures cited in the programme placed approximately €70 million in Russian deposits across the entire Andorran banking system. This cannot be attributed to Andbank alone. The programme also discusses Igor Mozgovoy’s documented transfer of 9,045,000 pesetas—about €54,000—to an Andbank account linked to Jordi Pujol Ferrusola, while making clear that this does not prove Mozgovoy bought in La Querola or financed it.
The central question remains unanswered: did Russian or Ukrainian capital ever appear among the actual buyers of La Querola? The material examined does not prove that it did. The buyers, beneficial owners, financing contracts, mortgages and insurance structures still need to be identified.
This is only Part One. Still missing are the financing contracts, insurers, buyers, beneficial owners, Seguretat Industrial and fire-service reports, and any eventual administrative, technical or financial responsibility.
We sincerely hope La Querola was a tragic accident. Precisely for that reason, every financial, technical, administrative and political question must be investigated to the end.
We will keep reporting because we are truly independent.
