Texte original publié par No es época para tontos.
n Ordino’s 2023 local election, Maria del Mar Coma won 55.64% of the vote and Enric Dolsa 44.36%. Yet the final institutional result was not 6–4 or anything close to the voters’ actual split. It became 8 councillors to 2 — 80% of the institutional power versus 20%. The voters did not create that supermajority. The electoral law did.
This investigation traces that distortion back thirty years, to 1993, when Enric Dolsa himself warned in the Andorran Parliament that the communal electoral formula could allow a list with only 30% of the vote to control 7 of 10 seats, leaving the remaining 70% of voters with just three representatives. His attempt to correct the system was rejected by 14 votes to 11, with 3 abstentions.
At the centre of the system is Article 66: the most-voted communal list automatically receives half of the seats, regardless of the winning margin, and then participates again in the proportional distribution of the remaining seats. In an extreme but legally possible scenario, 26% of the vote can become 70% of the institutional power.
The documentary also examines Andorra’s national electoral architecture: 14 national proportional seats and 14 territorial seats, two for each parish, with a winner-takes-all 2–0 rule at parish level. That means a one-vote difference can produce total territorial control for the winner and zero representation for the runner-up.
We also revisit the controversy surrounding the 456 judicially deposited votes in Ordino, the legal challenges brought by Enric Dolsa and Jordina Bringué, and the courts’ conclusion that no electoral fraud was proven. The issue is therefore not a claim of stolen votes, but a deeper question of forensic auditability, chain of custody and the burden of proof when the state controls the evidence needed to verify an election.
The final part explores the reform battle: open lists, preferential voting, panachage, STV, proportional allocation, the failed 2026 reform attempt, and the two-step roadmap for changing the system — first through electoral law, and later, if necessary, through constitutional reform and referendum.
The central question is simple:
If a democracy can legally transform 30% of the vote into 70% of the power, is the real democratic danger electoral fraud — or the law itself operating exactly as designed?
